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Abstract 
The implications of migrant agricultural production for the environment have interested 
policy  makers  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  of  late.  The  impacts  in  the  region  of  migrant 
destination  may be  short-term  including  initial felling of  trees,  intensive land use,  and 
application  of  techniques.  In  the  longer  term,  tenants  are  expected  to  adjust  their 
techniques to that of the indigenous landowners. This paper explains how migrant tenants 
manage the quality of rented plots in the absence of clearly defined property rights with a 
survey data from rural area in Ghana. An empirical model explaining the probability to 
invest  in  land  improvements  is  formulated.  The  empirical  results  indicate  that  tenure 
differences and income levels of migrants and indigenous landowners play a critical role in 
investments in land improvements.  
 
1. Introduction 
Rural  migrant  farm  households  have  been  perceived  as  one  of  the  principal  agents  of 
environmental degradation in sub-Saharan Africa. This notion has arisen because of the 
effects of their agricultural activities on the quality of plots which they rent on short-term 
basis. Due to insecurity of tenure on rented plots, there is the tendency for tenants to use the 
land continuously in the production of food crops such as maize, yam, cassava, plantain, 
rice, groundnuts, cowpea and so on. These rented plots are periodically put to fallow by 
indigenous landowners for the natural vegetation to regenerate and improve the fertility of 
the soil. The fallowed lands are also enriched with rapidly-growing trees as a means of 
raising the productivity of forest plots and upgrading the savanna plots. 
The impacts of agricultural activities on the region of migrant destination may be two-
fold:  short-term  and  long-term.  The  short-term  effects  include  initial  tree  felling  and 
application of techniques such as continuous cropping on the same piece of land, mulching, 
application  of  fertilizer,  and  planting  leguminous  crops  as  means  of  soil  fertility 
improvement. In the longer term, tenants are expected to adjust their techniques to that of 
the  indigenous  owner-cultivators  by  planting  trees  or allowing  the plots  to  fallow.  The 
objective of this paper is to show with a survey data that landless tenants adopt sustainable  
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land use practices on rented plots, although they often lack the incentives to undertake 
long-term investments on such plots.  
The paper then raises two important questions: What short-term and long-term land 
improvement methods are employed on rented plots? What determines tenant’s investments 
on rented plots? To answer these questions in the rest of the paper, Section 2 examines the 
environmental improvement discourse in the literature. Section 3 discusses investments on 
rented  plots  with  a  survey  data.  In Section  4,  theoretical  model  on  optimal  soil use  is 
formulated.  The  effects  of  tenure  differences  and  income  on  investment  in  land 
improvements  are  quantified  with  a  simultaneous  equation  model  in  Section  5.  The 
empirical results are discussed in Section 6. Conclusions are distilled in Section 7. 
 
2. The Discourse on Environmental Improvement 
The implications of agricultural activities for the quality of the environment have been 
controversial  in  the  literature
1.  Hall  et  al.  (1976)  have  described  the  transition  zone  in 
Ghana  as  an  area  experiencing  rapid  land  degradation  reminiscent  of  the  savanna  of 
Northern  Ghana  mainly  due  to  unsustainable  land  use  by  man.  They  argued  that  the 
selective removal of trees through felling or burning so as to open the forest canopy and 
allow sunlight through for cocoa and other food crop production is one of the catalysts for 
environmental degradation processes in the savanna-forest transition zone. The dominant 
view is that during land preparation, immigrant farmers slash and burn, cut many trees and 
stump to make way for construction of mounds and ridges with the view that crops tend to 
be less productive under shady conditions (Amanor, 1993; Afikorah-Danquah, 1997). The 
aim of setting these bush fires during land preparation for food crop production is to save 
time and cash.
2  
Recent  studies  however  appear  to  have  refuted  most  of  the  above  theories  on  the 
transition  zone.  Current  informed  studies  supported  by  historical  data  and  ecological 
                                                 
1  Literature draws a lot from Amanor (1993), Afikorah-Danquah (1997); Leach and Fairhead (2000), and 
informal discussions with Upper East migrant farm households and owner-cultivated households in Techiman 
and Nkoranza Districts of Brong Ahafo Region during the farm household survey in 2003. 
 
2 An informal discussion with an Upper East migrant farmer at Donkro-Nkwanta in Nkoranza District.  
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thinking seem to argue  otherwise (Amanor, 1993; Afikorah-Danquah, 1997; Leach and 
Fairhead,  2000).  The  forest-savanna  boundary  is  believed  to  have  been  stable  since 
historical times and have not retreated as earlier works had suggested. Leach and Fairhead 
(ibid) also show with historical evidence on Ghana and other parts of West Africa that 
farmers have been encouraging the formation of forest vegetation forms in the savanna 
through  settlement  strategies  and  agricultural  practices.  Gyasi  et  al.  (1994)  note  that 
specific  cropping  patterns  have  been  adopted  to  offset  the  changing  conditions  in  the 
biophysical environment in the transition zone. Poor farmers also tend to invest more in 
resource conservation measures when they have available cash from off-farm employment 
(Clay et al., 1995).  
 
3. Data and Evidence on Investments in Land Improvement Methods 
The paper employs cross-sectional data collected in 6 villages from 2 districts in Brong 
Ahafo Region of Ghana (Owusu 2007). The farm household survey was conducted under 
the supervision of the author between January and October in 2003. The unit of analysis is 
the plot-level. A total of 181 samples of Upper East migrant farm households with about 
346  rented  plots
3  were  randomly  selected  from  4  villages  in  Techiman  District  and  2 
villages  in  Nkoranza  District  of  Brong  Ahafo  Region  of  Ghana.  Similarly,  65  owner-
cultivated households with 214 plots were randomly selected from the same locations. The 
data sets for migrant tenants provide information on their personal history and in-migration, 
the  household’s  composition,  plot-level  characteristics,  present  and  future  use  of  plots, 
household income and assets, non-farm business activities and land improvement methods. 
With the exception of the history of in-migration, owner-cultivated households were asked 
similar questions. 
                                                 
3 The plots rented by Upper East migrant tenants in Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana were the fixed-rent and 
sharecropping types. Fixed-rent contract is land tenure arrangement in which the landowner hires out or leases 
part of his land to a tenant for a specific amount and stipulated duration. In sharecropping contracts, the rent is 
paid from the share of the output produced from the rented land. The tenant pays no explicit fixed cash to the 
owner but the landowner and the tenant choose between the standardized type of sharecropping contracts 
known as the abusa (one-third of output to the owner) and the abunu (a half of the output to the owner). Land 
acquisition by Upper East migrant farm households in Brong Ahafo Region have been discussed in detail in 
Owusu (2005).  
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 Owner-cultivated plots were generally more fertile than rented plots of migrant tenants. 
As indicated in Figure 1, more fertilizer, mulch and farm manure were invested on fixed-
rent plots than on sharecropped plots. However no tree planting or fallow was undertaken 
on fixed-rent plots probably due to lack of incentives to undertake long-term investments 
on temporarily rented plots. Migrants with taungya plots
4 on the other hand, invested more 
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Source: Author’s survey 
Figure 1.  Investments on rented plots 
 
The  short-term  land  improvements  are  categorized  into  cultivation,  agronomic  and 
management practices, and erosion control measures (Table 1). The proportion of owners 
using zero tillage exceeded that of migrant tenants. Zero tillage was not observed among 
farmers  in  Nkoranza  probably  due  to  wider  use  of  tractor  for  ploughing  and  ridging. 
Minimum tillage involves the use of hoes in the construction of mounds and ridges. 
 
                                                 
4 Taungya is a form of land access in Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana where tenants are allowed to farm freely 
in a designated forest reserve. However, they are required to plant trees under the supervision of the local 
















Type of investments  
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The proportion of owner-cultivators investing in mulch exceeds migrant tenants. Plant 
residues from previous cultivation are used to prevent the soil from direct impact of rains, 
sunshine and spread of bush fires. Mulch protects the soil from leaching, and suppresses the 
regeneration  of  unwanted  weeds.  It  is  mostly  practiced  by  yam  cultivators.  The  most 
common soil management practices are rotation of crops with legumes and application of 
fertilizer,  and  manure.  Manuring  was  more  prevalent  on  migrant  plots  than  owner-
cultivated plots. Generally, investments in soil fertility maintenance were higher than soil 
loss prevention. 
 
Table 1.  Distribution of short-term land improvement methods 
  % Migrant farm households     % Owner-cultivated households  
Activity   Techiman  Nkoranza    Techiman  Nkoranza 
Cultivation Practices           
Zero tillage  13      18   
Minimum tillage  67  64    85  97 
Agronomic Practices           
Mulching  41  51    47  83 
Management Practices           
Farm manure  23  16    22  7 
Legume intercrop  61  78    73  83 
Fertilizer application  43  67    69  62 
Erosion Control           
Ditches  9  4    18  4 
Ridging across slope  65  38    64  41 
Source: Author’s survey 
 
The  use  of  fallow  for  soil  fertility  enrichments  was  found  only  among  owner-
cultivators. The fallow or rest period allows the natural vegetation to re-emerge to be used 
as natural fertilizer in the next cultivation period. Fallow periods were between 1-3 years 
and 4-6 years. Fewer owner-cultivators put plots to fallow for a period of 15 years or more. 
Fallow was not practiced by tenants because they could not afford to put short-term rented 
plots to fallow.  
  The  most  significant  long-term  sustainability  strategy  is  tree  planting.  Some  of  the 
predominant trees planted include teak, cashew, oil palm, orange, mango, and indigenous 
trees. In addition to teak and cashew, some owner-cultivators planted oil palm and mango 
purposely for income generation. Most indigenous landowners planted trees to secure title  
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to plots but tenants planted trees as part of tenure agreements. In sharp contrast to the high 
incidence of short-term investments, we observe less investment in trees by tenants. Those 
who planted trees were located in Aworopata and Woraso in the Techiman District where 
taungya form of land access is prevalent. 
 
4. Theoretical Model 
Following Lopez (1997) and Angelsen (1999), a model of optimal soil use is formulated
5 in 
this section. Assume a soil capital  S  at a time t. If depletion rate of the soil capital is  S
i
, 
the soil capital replenished through land improvement methods by applying labour L is 
( ) L f and the amount of soil taken out of agricultural production,  A at each  time tis  A d , 
then  
( ) S dS dt L A f d = = -
i
                                                                                                        (1) 
Agricultural production,  A is a function of existing soil capital,  S  and variable inputs,  x 
such as fertiliser, seeds and planting materials. 
( , ) A f S x =                                                                                                                            (2) 
Hence from (1) and (2) 
( ) ( , ) S L f S x f d = -
i
                                                                                                              (3) 
where  0 L f > ,  0 LL f <  and  0 (0) S S =  and  0 d ¹  
The aggregate profit function  becomes  
( , ) pf S x wL x h P = - -                                                                                                         (4) 
where  wis the cost of labour input, h is the price of variable inputs and  p denotes the 
output price.  








= P ∫ , 
subject to  ( ) ( , ) S L f S x f d = -
i
                                                                                            (5) 
                                                 
5 The theoretical models by Lopez and Angelsen focused on optimal forest use.  
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where r is the discount rate. 
 
The optimal control problem can be solved by forming the current value of Hamiltonian 
( , ) ( ( ) ( , )) H pf S x wL x L f S x h y f d = - - + -                               (6) 
where  Land  x are the control variables,  S  is the state variable and y  is the co-state 
variable representing the shadow value of soil capital or user cost of soil capital. 
The optimal path to steady state equilibrium can be solved by obtaining the first order 
derivatives 
0 L H L w yf ¶ ¶ = - + = ⇒   L w yF =                                            (7) 
0 x x H x pf f h yd ¶ ¶ = - - = ⇒ ( ) x p f yd h - =                                                                    (8) 
H S ay y ¶ ¶ = -
i
⇒  S S pf f yd ay y - = -
i
 ⇒ ( ) S f p yd ay y - = -
i
              (9) 
where a denotes the market interest rate.  
H S y ¶ ¶ =
i
⇒ ( ) ( , ) L f S x S f d - =
i
                                                                                   (10)  
Equation (7) implies that in the optimum, the  value of  marginal product (VMP) of 
labour used in soil fertility maintenance,  L yf equals the factor price,  w which represents 
the shadow wage of land improvements. Equation (8)  indicates that the VMP of variable 
inputs equal its price, h. Re-arranging (9), yields   ( ) S f P y d y y a - + =
i
, suggesting that 
the market interest rate equals the net value of marginal product (rent) of soil capital plus 
the price per unit of soil capital appreciation or depreciation. 
The steady state conditions show the sustainable soil capital use on the land. At the 
steady state, the soil capital is neither appreciating nor depreciation. So at the steady state 
S
i
=0 ⇒   ( ) ( , ) 0 L f S x f d - =  ⇒  ( , ) ( ) f S x L f d =                                                          (11) 
0 y y =
i
⇒  ( ) S f P y d a - =                                                                                             (12) 
The net VMP is therefore equals to the market rate of return on the other form of capital, 
a at the steady state. We can solve (7), (8), (11) and (12) to obtain the four unknowns 
L,x,S  and y .  
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5. Empirical Analysis  
We investigate in this Section what determines the probability to invest in short-term and 
long-term  land  improvement  methods.  The  short-term  methods  include  mulching,  crop 
rotation  (with  legumes),  manuring,  application  of  fertilizer,  construction  of  ditches  and 
ridging across slopes. Although short-term investments in land improvements have short 
payback periods, they could affect the productivity of the land even in future cropping 
seasons. The long-term investments include tree planting (owners and tenants) and fallow 
(owners). The dependent variable is a discrete choice variable in a sense that it measures 
whether the farmer has invested in any of the land improvement methods on his plot since 
he acquired (rented) it.  
  The ability to invest in land improvement methods would depend on the household’s 
heterogeneity  in  terms  of  its  wealth  and  human  capital  endowments.  The  household’s 
wealth includes livestock and earnings from off-farm employments. Farm characteristics 
such as acreages under cultivation, previous soil fertility status measured as fallowed years 
before acquisition of plot and distance of plot from home may influence investment in land 
improvement  method.  To  control  for  other  tenure  arrangements,  we  include  a  dummy 
variable  for  migrant  tenants  under  the  taungya  system  since  they  are  distinguished  by 
location.  The  extent  to  which  owners  hire  out  land  is  controlled  with  the  inclusion  of 
rented-out plots to tenants.  
 
5.1. Model Specification  
Assuming that the propensity to invest in land improvement method on a plot i by the farm 
household is a latent variable
*
i t , we specify the land improvement investment function as 
* * * *
0 1 2 3 4 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) i a a a a a z e land earnings livestock t ¢ = + + + + +                                       (13) 
where  1 z   is  a  vector  of  household  and  plot-level  characteristics,  and  some  location 
dummies;  1 a  ,  2 a  , and  3 a  are parameter estimates for land, off-farm earnings and livestock 
wealth  respectively  and  4 a¢  is  a  vector  of  parameters  for  household  and  plot-level 
characteristics, and location dummies;  0 a  is the intercept and  1 e  is the error term.  
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Since 
*
i t is unobserved, we only observe a dummy variable  i t  defined by 










                                                                                                             (14) 
where   i t  =1 if the farmer has invested in the land improvement method on the plot i since 
he acquired the plot and 0 otherwise. 
If the error term  1 e  in (13) follows a standard normal distribution, then the probability 
to invest in land improvement method is quantified using a probit model (Maddala 2001). 
However, acreages under rent contracts, off-farm earnings and livestock wealth cannot be 
treated as exogenous in the relevant investment equations. Besley (1995) did not take this 
into account. The endogeneity problem posed by acreages under rent contracts, off-farm 
earnings and livestock wealth is eliminated by re-specifying the investment equation (13) as 
a system of simultaneous equations where each of the endogenous variable is expressed in a 
reduced form comprising of only right-hand side exogenous variables. First, the equation 
determining acreages under tenancy contracts
 is expressed as   
* * *
0 1 2 3 2 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) j land b b earnings b livestock b z e ¢ = + + + +                                                     (15) 
where  j =1 if land is cultivated under fixed-rent contract and  j =2 if land is cultivated 
under sharecropping contract;  2 z  is a vector of household and farm characteristics and 
some  location  dummies;  1 b   and  2 b   are  parameter  estimates  for  off-farm  earnings  and 
livestock wealth and  3 b¢ is a vector of parameters for household and farm characteristics and 
some location dummies;  0 b  is the intercept term and  2 e  is the error term. 
Earnings  from  off-farm  employments  and  livestock  wealth  cannot  be  considered 
exogenous in (15). So these endogenous variables are further expressed in separate reduced 
forms (16) and (17) where the right hand side variables are now weakly exogenous (Smith 
and Blundell, 1986). 
0 1 3 3 earnings c c z e ¢ = + +                                                                                                (16)                                              
0 1 4 4 livestock d d z e ¢ = + +                                                                                           (17) 
where  3 z   and  4 z   are  vectors  of  exogenous  variables  explaining  off-farm  earnings  and  
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livestock wealth;  1 c¢ and  1 d¢ are vectors of parameter estimates;  0 c  and  0 d  are intercept 
terms;  3 e  and  4 e  are error terms. 
 
5.2. Estimation Strategy 
The land improvement investment equation (13) for migrant tenants is estimated in 3 steps. 
Firstly,  because  off-farm  earnings  and  livestock  wealth  contain  a  number  of  zero 
observations,  the  reduced  form  equations  (16)  and  (17)  are  estimated  with  a  Tobit 
maximum likelihood. Secondly, the predicted values of off-farm earnings and livestock 
wealth  are  substituted  into  the  reduced  form  equation  (15)  for  the  new  equation  to  be 
estimated with a Tobit maximum likelihood. The Tobit model is appropriate because of 
zero observations associated with acreages under fixed-rent and sharecropping contracts. 
Finally, the estimated fixed-rent and sharecropped acreages, together with the estimated 
off-farm  earnings  and  livestock  wealth  are  substituted  into  the  land  improvement 
investment equation (13) for the final model to be estimated with a probit model. Different 
probit models are estimated for migrant tenants and owner-cultivators
6. The treatment of 
owner-cultivated plots permits the interpretation of the farm size effects on investments. 
Owner-cultivated acreages are assumed exogenous so the estimation of equation (15) is 
skipped
7. 
The instruments used for off-farm earnings in the land improvement model for rented 
plots include age, age squared, education and education squared.  Livestock wealth was 
instrumented by age, age squared, education and dummies for religion and veterinary visits. 
In addition to the estimated land variables, duration of stay, distance of plot from home and 
previous years of fallow were included in the models. Off-farm earnings of owners were 
instrumented by age, education and education squared. Livestock wealth of owners was 
also instrumented by age, education, some demographic characteristics, and dummies for 
religion and veterinary visits. Off-farm earnings and livestock wealth were measured in 
Ghanaian Cedis (¢), land cultivated in acres, and age of household head in years. Education 
                                                 
6 Preliminary investigations showed that tenants and owners have different behavioural functions. 
7  The  endogeneity  problem  posed  by  land  cultivated  by  owners  was  ignored  in  this  paper  due  to  data 
limitations on how owners acquired their plots.  
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refers to years of formal education of the household head. Age and education proxy for 
skills and experience of the farmer.  
 
6. Results and Discussions 
6.1. Empirical Results 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation are contained in Table 2. 
The empirical estimates on the probability to invest in land improvement method on rented  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the regressions 
Rented plots (N=346)    Owner-cultivated plots (N=214) 
  Mean  S.d    Mean   S.d 
Dependent variables         
Ridging across slope  0.47  0.50    0.28  0.45 
Ditches  0.07  0.25    0.10  0.30 
Farm manure  0.18  0.39    0.07  0.25 
Mulch  0.36  0.48    0.34  0.48 
Legumes  0.39  0.49    0.44  0.50 
Fertilizer  0.44  0.50    0.39  0.49 
Trees  0.51  0.50    0.31  0.46 
Fallow        0.74  0.44 
Explanatory variables                
Acreage under fixed-rent 
♀  1.60  2.47       
Acreage under sharecropping
♀  0.79  1.58       
Duration of stay  13.95  9.57       
Land cultivated 
♀♀        12.36  17.28 
Distance of plot from home  4.40  4.03    0.15  2.11 
Previous years of fallow   4.61  5.65    3.36  3.40 
Off-farm earnings 
♀  2.88  5.41    2.50  6.02 
Livestock wealth 
♀  15.52  32.21    4.21  54.61 
Education  1.93  3.86    6.72  4.91 
Taungya dummy   0.15  0.36       
Aworopata dummy  0.09  0.29    0.19  0.39 
Woraso dummy  0.21  0.41    0.13  0.33 
Ayerede dummy  0.26  0.44    0.28  0.45 
Dromankese dummy  0.08  0.26    0.10  0.30 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable =1 if investment is undertaken on a plot and 0 
otherwise.  Land  cultivated  in  acres;  fallowed  years,  education,  and  duration  of  stay  in  years; 
distance  of  plots  from  home  in  kilometers.  Earnings  and  livestock  wealth  are  in  millions  of 
Ghanaian Cedis (¢). Exchange rate: US $1=¢8500 in 2003. 
♀Represents variables instrumented in 
the regression models. 
♀♀Refers to land cultivated by owners. 
Source: Author’s survey.  
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plots are provided in Table 3. Tenants with large fixed-rent acreages invest less in farm 
manure  but  sharecroppers  invest  more  in  farm  manure.  Investment  in  mulch  on 
sharecropped plots was higher than on fixed-rent plots. Tenants with larger sharecropped  
 
Table 3. Probit estimates of determinants of land improvement participation on rented plots 
Variable  Ridging  
across 
slope 
Ditches  Farm 
manure 
Mulch  Legume  Fertilizer        Trees 












































































































































































































Woraso  0.1121 
(0.26) 












































2  0.0895  0.2340  0.2447  0.2155  0.2533  0.1652  0.1620 
Log-likelihood ratio   -217.72  -60.44  -111.39  -176.65  -172.45  -198.28  -168.47 
No. of observations  346  273  273  346  346  346  295 
Note: 
† significant at 1%, 
§ significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
Source: Author’s survey  
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acreages invest more in fertilizer than those with fixed-rent acreages probably to secure 
longer  tenure  duration.  Due  to  tenure  insecurity  on  rented  plots,  we  expect  long-term 
investments on fixed-rent and sharecropping plots to be lower, ceteris paribus. Empirically, 
investment in trees was insignificant even at 10 percent on rented plots. 
 























































































































































































































   (-3.59)
† 
Dromankese  -0.7199 
(-1.28) 














2  0.1063  0.1194  0.3010  0.1126  0.0159  0.0755  0.1238  0.4340 
Log-likelihood 
ratio  
-112.61  -58.47  -30.8856  -121.88  -135.32  -132.53  -116.55  -65.79 
No. of 
observations 
214   193   128  214  214  214  214  193 
Note: 
† significant at 1%, 
§ significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s survey 
 
   Tenants with higher off-farm earnings invest less in farm manure and mulch. Those 
higher  livestock  wealth  invest  more  in  manure  but  decrease  investments  in  mulch  and  
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legumes. Apart from tree planting, tenants with taungya plots also invest more in farm 
manure and legumes. The effects of the size of farm on investment in farm manure or 
fertilizer if extra unit of fixed-rent and sharecropped acreages are added are 0.8294 and 
1.0337  respectively
8.  When  a  unit  of  fixed-rent  acreage  is  replaced  by  a  unit  of 
sharecropped acreage, the effect of tenure composition on investment in farm manure or 
fertilizer are -1.3824 and -0.0455 respectively. 
  We turn our attention on the empirical estimates of investments by owner-cultivators. 
The  descriptive  statistics have  been  provided in  Table  2  and  the  estimation results  are 
reported in Table 4. Owner-cultivators with larger acreages invest more in fertilizer and 
fallow but less in farm manure and mulch. The extent to which owners hire out land to 
tenants do not influence investments on their plots. Similar to what occurred on rented 
plots, owners with higher off-farm earnings do not invest much in ditches or farm manure 
or mulch or even trees as soil quality improvement. Owners with higher livestock wealth 
invest more in legumes but less in mulch. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the effects of tenure differences on the quality of soil in a rural 
area of Ghana. Despite lack of incentives to undertake long-term investments on rented 
plots, landless tenants resorted to short-term investments. The effects of tenure differences 
and income levels on the propensity to undertake short-term or long-term investments were 
empirically  tested.  The  results  were  robust  as  the  endogeneity  of  off-farm  earnings, 
livestock  wealth  and  acreages  under  tenancy  contracts  were  accounted  for.  The  results 
revealed that tenants with larger sharecropped acreages invest more in mulch and farm 
manure but those with larger fixed-rent acreages invest less in mulch and farm manure. 
  The  prospects  for  tenants  include  long-term  tenure  arrangements  where  trees  for 
instance,  could be  sharecropped.  The  possibility  of  re-entering  into new  contract  terms 
would  ensure  continuity  of  cultivating  crops  and  applying  techniques  that  improve  the
                                                 
8 The sum (or average) of the coefficients of the two land variables simulates what would happen if an extra 
unit of both types are added (i.e. the effects of farm size). The difference simulates what would happen if a 
unit of sharecropped land is replaced by a unit of fixed-rent land (i.e. effects of tenure composition).  
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quality of soil on rented plots and relative income positions of tenants. Enhancing farmers’ 
efficiency and skills through effective extension delivery is one of the policy options that 
could maintain fertility of rented plots. Replicating profitable agro forestry systems will go 
a long way to reduce rural poverty and improve the forest vegetation. Also the development 
of improved species, especially rapidly growing commercial trees must be pursued. The 
crusade  against  wild  and  bush  fires  should  be  stepped  up  by  stakeholders  involved  in 
environmental conservation.  
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